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Introduction
The OSGi framework [26] is a Java-based component platform that is being widely adopted as an execution environment for the development of extensible applications, such as Eclipse [2] or Java Enterprise Servers [3] . Extensibility in the OSGi platform is provided through a deployment unit called a bundle, which groups together a set of components that are loaded through a specific Java class loader. The OSGi platform is popular because it provides modularity while still providing efficient communication through direct method calls between components.
Initially, the OSGi platform was designed for environments where all bundles trust each other. Nowadays, it is also being promoted for systems such as next generation Internet home gateways where third party services can be downloaded dynamically [31] . However, the OSGi platform cannot protect a bundle against another malicious or buggy bundle. First, java.lang.Class objects, strings and static variables are shared in the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). The corruption of any one of these entities by a malicious or buggy bundle will impact all bundles. Second, a thread can freeze the JVM and deny service by exhausting memory or monopolizing the CPU. Third, it may be impossible to terminate a bundle that denies service, which makes a shut down of the entire platform the only solution. Not surprisingly, a recent work has identified 25 different vulnerabilities in current implementations of the Java/OSGi platform that may either lead to a violation of data integrity or a freeze of the platform [29] . While 17 of these vulnerabilities are due to a weak implementation of the OSGi framework itself and can be solved by adding suitable security checks, the remaining 8 originate in isolation issues and need to be solved at the JVM level.
Several approaches to providing isolation in a single JVM, through Isolates (or Java processes) have been recently introduced [5, 9, 17] . These solutions duplicate the java.lang.Class objects, strings and static variables between isolates. However, to ensure full isolation, they confine a thread to a single isolate. As a consequence, a communication between two isolates must be done using an RPC-like mechanism, which involves parameter copying and in some cases thread synchronization. Since the OSGi platform uses communication between bundles heavily, using RPCs would induce a significant overhead. For example, despite using a highly optimized virtual machine, the developers of Singularity [12] report that a simple local remote procedure call through a shared heap takes about 2500 cycles while a direct call takes only about 10 cycles. Additionally, copying parameters implies modifying legacy bundles either at the source or bytecode level [34] , that could compromise compatibility with legacy bundles. This paper presents I-JVM, a Java Virtual Machine with lightweight isolates that is specifically designed to support the needs of the OSGi platform by associating each bundle with a separate isolate. The key contribution of I-JVM is to permit thread migration between isolates in order to keep the cost of an inter-isolate method call low. This enables complete bytecode compatibility with legacy OSGi bundles by avoiding the need to rewrite inter-bundle method calls. The main features of I-JVM are:
• Memory isolation. As shown by the Multi-Tasking Virtual Machine (MVM) [9] , making java.lang.-Class objects, strings and static variables private to an isolate is sufficient to ensure memory isolation in a single JVM. Therefore, an isolate cannot access an object of another isolate unless a reference is given explicitly through method invocation.
• Resource accounting. I-JVM keeps track of the current isolate in which a thread is running. This allows recording the amount of memory and CPU time spent within an isolate. These statistics provide sufficient information for an administrator or for resource policies to detect denial of service attacks from malicious bundles.
• Termination of isolates. When an isolate terminates, its classes should not be invoked anymore. In case a thread returns back to the terminating isolate, I-JVM modifies the stack so that an exception is raised and trapped at a lower stack level. All the objects referenced by the terminating isolate are reclaimed by the garbage collector, with the exception of objects shared with other bundles.
I-JVM has been developed by modifying the VMKit Java Virtual Machine [15, 16] , a JVM specifically designed for easing experiments in Java. We have used I-JVM to run two legacy OSGi platforms: Felix [1] of the Apache Community and Equinox [2] of the Eclipse Project.
Overall the results of this study are:
• I-JVM solves the OSGi JVM-related weaknesses identified in [29] . We present 8 attacks that cover these weaknesses.
• I-JVM has a 16% overhead on inter-bundle calls. This is an order of magnitude better than the cost of an RPC call between two processes. Overall, the I-JVM slowdown is between 1% and 20% on a representative suite of macrobenchmarks.
• I-JVM requires the addition of only 650 lines of code to VMKit. Implementing I-JVM features in a legacy JVM should not be much more complex.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the vulnerabilities of the OSGi platform. Section 3 explains and discusses the design and implementation of I-JVM. Section 4 provides performance measurements of I-JVM, and evaluates its robustness against denial of service attacks. Section 5 describes related work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Vulnerabilities of OSGi
Vulnerabilities in OSGi have been identified at three sources [29] : (i) at the underlying operating system level, (ii) at the OSGi platform level and (iii) at the JVM level. The first kind of vulnerability is due to the possibility of running native code either inside the JVM process or as a separate process. These vulnerabilities are enabled by JNI or the Runtime.exec Java call. The second kind of vulnerability is related to weaknesses in the OSGi run-time and can be solved by adding security checks in the OSGi implementation [29] . In this paper, we attempt to solve the third kind of vulnerability which targets the JVM platform.
JVM vulnerabilities can themselves be subdivided into three categories: (i) lack of isolation, (ii) lack of resource accounting, (iii) failure to terminate a bundle. In the rest of this section, we present a list of 8 attacks that cover the previously reported JVM vulnerabilities in [28, 29] . Our experiments in Section 4 show that all attacks may corrupt, freeze or abort unprotected OSGi platforms.
Lack of isolation.
As mentioned previously, java.lang.-Class objects, strings and static variables are shared in the JVM by all bundles. A malicious bundle can alter static variables or lock shared objects, and therefore interfere with the execution of other bundles. We consider two representative attacks:
• A1 -Modification of a static variable: All bundles share static variables. Therefore a bundle can modify a public non-final static variable defined by either other bundles, the OSGi platform or the core Java System Library. For example, a malicious bundle can set a shared variable to null, thus preventing the correct execution of other bundles. Bundles can discover static variables from other bundles either at compilation, or at runtime with the reflection API of Java.
• A2 -Synchronized method or synchronized call block: a bundle can lock shared strings, java.lang.Class objects or static variables, which can eventually freeze the system.
Lack of resource accounting. JVMs implement a bundle by using a specific class loader. However, JVMs do not perform resource accounting on a per class loader basis. In case of the over-use of resources, it is impossible to identify the faulty bundle and stop execution of its code. Resource accounting would help detecting the following five denial of service attacks:
• A3 -Memory exhaustion: a malicious bundle consumes most of the memory by holding references to many or large objects. This leads to an OutOfMemoryError for other bundles.
• A4 -Standalone infinite loop: a malicious bundle consumes all CPU resources by entering an infinite loop.
• A5 -Excessive object creation: a malicious bundle repetitively allocates objects without referencing them, thus triggering garbage collection and object finalization, which monopolize the CPU.
• A6 -Excessive thread creation: a malicious bundle crashes the platform by exceeding the number of threads supported.
• A7 -Hanging thread: a malicious bundle blocks when being called, thus never returning to the caller.
Bundle termination. In some situations, the JVM is unable to unload a bundle and deallocate all its allocated objects. First, other bundles may continue to reference the bundle, thus preventing the JVM from unloading the bundle classes, because a call to methods defined by the classes of the bundle can still occur. Second, if the OSGi runtime recognizes a bundle as misbehaving and wants to stop its execution, methods of the bundle may be executing or be in the call stack of running threads.
• A8 -Lack of termination support: a malicious bundle continues execution even if the OSGi platform tries to unload it.
Finally, misuse of the Java finalize method is a vulnerability, not reported in [28] , that targets any platform with dynamic class loading. A malicious code can run an infinite loop in the method and therefore prevent any memory reclamation. We do not discuss this vulnerability in this paper because we think the JVM should never allow an untrusted class to override the finalize method.
I-JVM Design and Implementation
The design goal of I-JVM is to provide bundle isolation while preserving the communication model of the OSGi platform, which relies on direct method calls. An OSGi application is composed of a set of dynamically loaded bundles and of the OSGi runtime itself. To implement isolation, each bundle is executed within a separate isolate. Additionally, the OSGi runtime runs in a specific isolate, Isolate0, which has higher rights than standard bundles.
In this section, we present I-JVM in detail. We focus on the main issues: isolation, resource accounting and termination of isolates. Then we report the implementation of I-JVM in VMKit [15, 16] , and finally we describe how to run an OSGi platform using I-JVM.
Design
I-JVM permits explicit object sharing between isolates by passing an object reference in an inter-isolate method call. The key point of I-JVM is to provide thread migration between isolates in a single address space, which is a prerequisite for object sharing. Different isolates execute therefore on the same execution stack, which impacts isolation, resource accounting and termination.
Isolation and Thread Migration
I-JVM runs isolates in the same address space. Isolates provide a lightweight protection mechanism integrated in the JVM, so that the classes running in one isolate cannot crash classes running in another independent isolate. In I-JVM, an isolate is built from a class loader, so its scope is the classes loaded by the class loader. There is a specific isolate, Isolate0, which has higher rights on the platform than standard isolates. These rights are the permissions to start a new isolate, to terminate an isolate and to shut down the entire Java platform. The first Java class loader created becomes Isolate0. The subsequent class loaders are standard isolates.
An inter-isolate method call induces a thread migration. Each thread possesses a reference to the isolate in which it is currently running. This reference is updated on each crossisolate call. A method defined in the Java System Library is not executed in a special isolate but in the isolate that called it.
To implement isolates, the main change from the JVM specification is to have a per-isolate private copy of static variables, strings and java.lang.Class objects. This is sufficient to ensure that an isolate does not have access to the internal state of another isolate since: (i) an isolate cannot construct a foreign reference thanks to the type safety of the Java bytecode; (ii) an isolate cannot access an isolateprivate field or method thanks to the scope of fields and methods in the Java bytecode.
Isolation of static variables is done by associating an array of task class mirrors (defined by MVM in [9] ) per class. The task class mirror of a class contains the initialization state of the class, the static variables and the associated java.lang.Class object. Each isolate is assigned an index into the array. I-JVM uses the current isolate reference of the thread as an index into the array of task class mirrors of a class. Accessing a static variable requires fetching the execution environment, loading the isolate reference from the execution environment, loading the task class mirror and finally loading the static variable. Compared to simply loading a static variable, the task class mirror approach requires two additional loads. An isolate also always has to check the initialization state of a class before accessing one of its static variable or before calling a static method. Similarly to MVM, the just in time compiler cannot remove all of the class initialization checks, because the code compiled must be reentrant.
Resource Accounting
I-JVM monitors the execution of isolates. Resources consumed in the code of an isolate are charged to the isolate. Resources consumed in a method of the Java System Library are charged to the caller of the method. I-JVM counts the CPU time consumed, the memory used, the number of threads created, the number of connections used, the number of bytes read or written through I/O connections, and the number of garbage collection activations.
Memory and connections:
The problem of memory accounting in OSGi is that multiple bundles share objects. I-JVM follows the garbage collector memory accounting algorithm of Price et al. [30] , which specifically deals with different protection domains sharing a same object. The overall insight of their algorithm is that the garbage collector performs the memory accounting.
On a garbage collector activation, the collector scans the memory used by threads and charges an object to a task the first time the object is traversed. On subsequent execution of the collector, the shared object may be charged to another task. Although imprecise, this algorithm still offers a range of memory usages for a task, from maximum (all memory reachable from the task) to minimum (memory reachable only from the task). The author acknowledges that the approach opens a door to a resource Trojan horse problem [20] where a task allocates a large object that becomes shared, but the collector charges the object to another task. We discuss this issue in Section 6.
Threads: I-JVM counts the number of threads an isolate creates. I-JVM charges threads to their creator, even if they execute code from a random isolate via inter-bundle calls.
I/O reads and writes: Any read or write to a connection is instrumented in order to charge the isolate performing the operation. The approach is similar to accounting of network resources in JRes [10] : there are few classes that perform reads and writes on connections, and instrumenting them is straightforward.
CPU time: For CPU accounting, we have studied two solutions. The first one is to insert per-isolate time updates during an inter-isolate call. This induces a significant performance penalty because it requires: (i) two system calls to fetch the current time, one when entering and one when leaving the isolate and (ii) a lock acquisition to update the CPU time when leaving the call. Therefore, we chose a second solution in which I-JVM counts the CPU time spent in isolates by regularly sampling the value of the isolate reference of a running thread.
Garbage collection: I-JVM uses a single GC for all isolates. To detect attacks on garbage collection activations, I-JVM counts the number of times an isolate triggers the GC.
Isolate Termination
There are two main problems when terminating an isolate. First, threads migrate between isolates; therefore I-JVM cannot just kill the threads created by the isolate. Also, a thread created by another isolate may be executing code from the terminating isolate. Second, shared objects referenced by other isolates cannot be released.
When terminating an isolate, I-JVM stops the execution of all threads by sending them a signal. The handler of the signal is defined at startup and cannot be modified by isolates, thanks to the Java language. Upon receiving the signal, a thread inspects and modifies its stack as follows. For each frame, if it is called from a frame that belongs to the terminating isolate, the thread changes the return pointer to throw a StoppedIsolateException exception. The exception manager makes sure that all synchronized objects on the stack are released. Also, the terminating isolate cannot catch this exception: even if the isolate tries to catch it in the Java code, I-JVM will ignore it. Finally, I-JVM takes a special action for the last frame:
• If it belongs to the Java System Library, I-JVM sets the interrupted flag of the thread so that I/O or sleep calls are interrupted. This approach is similar to protection domain termination in Spring [18] .
• If it belongs to the terminating isolate, the thread throws the StoppedIsolateException.
Moreover, code from the terminating isolate should not be called anymore. I-JVM prevents execution of the isolate by (i) not JIT compiling the methods not JITed yet and (ii) inserting at the beginning of all methods defined by the isolate an unconditional branch that jumps to a function that throws the StoppedIsolateException.
An isolate is only removed from memory when there is no remaining object whose class is defined by the isolate.
This approach is similar to the now deprecated Thread.stop mechanism. The Thread.stop method was deprecated because it may lead to objects with inconsistent states. Since only objects from the terminating isolate and shared objects used by the isolate may become inconsistent, we think the benefits of being able to terminate a bundle outweigh the inconsistency problems.
I-JVM Implementation
We have implemented I-JVM in the VMKit virtual machine [15, 16] which is specification compliant with the JVM. Overall, I-JVM required the addition of 650 lines of code to VMKit which are distributed as follows:
• Static variables, strings and java.lang.Class objects:
200 lines of code for implementing the task class mirror in each class. The changes are done at two levels: (i) in the Java class representation, which contains the task class mirror, (ii) in the bytecode translator to modify the accesses to static variables and java.lang.Class objects to reference the task class mirror.
• Method call: 150 lines of code for the update of the isolate reference in each isolate method compiled by VMKit.
• Resource accounting: 100 lines of code for accounting, for CPU, memory, I/O and threads.
• Isolate per bundle: 50 lines of code to create and attach a new isolate to a class loader when the latter first loads a class.
• Isolate termination: 150 lines of code for the termination of isolates.
These numbers are quite low and suggest that implementing I-JVM within a legacy JVM should be relatively easy.
Running OSGi on I-JVM
An OSGi application is made of a set of dynamically loaded bundles and the OSGi runtime itself. To implement protection, each bundle is executed within a separate isolate; the OSGi runtime runs in the Isolate0.
Isolate0 is associated with the applicative class loader that loads the main function of the OSGi framework. When OSGi loads a new bundle, it allocates a new class loader, and I-JVM associates a standard isolate to this class loader. This makes it possible to run a legacy OSGi runtime on I-JVM without any modification. The start method of a bundle receives an object that represents OSGi. This object is the first shared object between bundles. It is used in OSGi to register object references in a name service and to find foreign references. Hence, at startup, a bundle can only access foreign objects in this name service.
We additionally define a few rules that an OSGi runtime should follow:
1. It should create a new thread when calling the start and stop methods of a bundle, in order to prevent a malicious bundle from freezing the OSGi runtime.
2. It should use Java permissions to deny access of privileged resources to bundles. For example, the JVM already verifies that a class has the correct permissions to run nonJava code through the use of the JNI interface or the Runtime.exec call, or to call the System.exit method which shuts down the JVM.
3. It should send a StoppedBundleEvent to all bundles when a bundle is being killed. A bundle can then take any action it desires: it can ignore the event or may release the references it had on the terminating bundle objects. If the bundle does not release the references, I-JVM may charge the objects to the bundle. The key point is that resources from the terminating bundle will not be released until all bundles release their references to them.
We also define one rule for writing bundles. A bundle should be prepared to catch any kind of exception when calling a method from another bundle, to ensure that it will continue its execution even in the presence of faulty bundles. Like any regular JVM, I-JVM uses exceptions to signal an error during the execution of an isolate. Such errors include regular errors such as erroneous class files or null pointer exceptions, but also I-JVM specific errors when the isolate is being killed.
Evaluation
In this section, we first motivate the need for fast interbundle calls in OSGi by benchmarking a simple OSGi application. Then, we evaluate I-JVM, in terms of performance and memory overhead, and in terms of robustness against attacks.
Inter-bundle Calls
To motivate the approach of OSGi and the need for fast inter-bundle calls, we evaluated the application demo provided by Felix [1] . The application is a paint program architectured with bundles. The drawing area, as well as the shapes that can be drawn are implemented as bundles. The user can add shapes dynamically or remove them through the OSGi bundle manager.
We measured the number of inter-bundle calls when I-JVM executes the application. Each time a shape is dragged onto the drawing area, an inter-bundle call happens between Local call Local RMI Incommunicado I-JVM 20µs 90ms 9ms 24µs the drawing area and the shape. Dragging and moving the shape from upper-left to the bottom-right makes roughly two hundred inter-bundle calls. Table 1 shows the time for performing two hundred inter-bundle calls depending on the communication implementation. We evaluate four kinds of implementations: (i) local call, (ii) RMI call, which is the standard inter-application communication in Java, (iii) Incommunicado [27] , the communication model of Isolates, and (iv) I-JVM. Since we do not have access to an Incommunicado implementation, we rely on the number they report, which is ten times faster than RMI [27] . I-JVM is an order of magnitude faster than other approaches for interisolate communication.
Performance Overhead of I-JVM
Since VMKit has been implemented from scratch for easing experimentation with virtual machines, it does not compete with industrial JVMs. We thus report our experiments in terms of relative performance and memory overheads of I-JVM compared to VMKit.
All experiments were done on a Pentium D 3.0GHz with 3GB of memory running Mandriva Linux 2.6.23.
To evaluate the overhead of isolation and resource accounting in I-JVM, we have run the following set of microbenchmarks: intra-isolate and inter-isolate calls, object allocation and access to static variables. We measured the overhead by performing the same operation a million times. We also ran the SPEC JVM98 benchmark in an isolate to measure the overall runtime cost of I-JVM. Finally, we evaluated the memory overhead induced by running two legacy implementations of OSGi, Felix [1] and Equinox [2] on top of I-JVM. Figure 1 shows the relative performance of I-JVM compared to VMKit for the micro-benchmarks. I-JVM adds two test instructions when executing an intra-isolate method call. For an inter-isolate call, it also updates the current isolate of the thread, thus adding four store operations. Overall, an intra-bundle call induces a 14% overhead and an inter-bundle call induces a 16% overhead.
We also benchmarked the performance of object allocation by repetitively allocating a java.lang.Object object. In VMKit and I-JVM, the size of such an object is 28 bytes. The results show that there is an 18% overhead compared to VMKit, due to resource accounting, testing the memory limit when an isolate allocates an object and the intrabundle cost of calling the java.lang.Object constructor. Finally, we measured static variable access. We removed all compilation optimizations in I-JVM to exhibit the cost of one access to the static variable. The benchmark shows that accessing a static variable gives a 46% overhead penalty on I-JVM. This is due to the task class mirror requiring two loads more than a simple load of a static variable plus an initialization check to verify that the static variable has been allocated. When I-JVM runs with all compilation optimizations, the overhead of accessing a static variable a million times is below 1% because the extra instructions execute only once.
We measured the execution time of SPEC JVM98 benchmarks [4] running within Isolate0, so as to evaluate the over- head of I-JVM for standard Java programs. Figure 2 shows that the overhead of I-JVM is below 20% for all benchmarks. By comparison with MVM that reports a maximum overhead of 10% [9] , I-JVM is less efficient. The main reason is that I-JVM induces an overhead for resource accounting and the test during intra-isolate calls. However, the cost of inter-isolate communication in MVM is an order of magnitude higher than a simple method call [27] .
Finally, we measured the memory overhead induced by I-JVM when running an OSGi implementation. There are two places where I-JVM requires more memory than a standard JVM: (i) the array of task class mirrors for each class and (ii) a per-isolate set of strings and statistics information. Figure 3 shows the memory used when running the base configurations of Felix and Equinox. Felix runs the OSGi runtime and three management bundles (administration, shell, repository). Equinox runs the OSGi runtime and twenty-two management bundles. Overall, the memory overhead for both OSGi implementations is below 16%.
Robustness Evaluation
In Section 2, we presented a set of attacks to measure the robustness of JVM implementations running an OSGi platform. In this section, we compare the result of executing these attacks on I-JVM and on the Sun JVM, OpenJDK 6. I-JVM prevents the eight kinds of attacks by relying on an administrator. With the Sun JVM, the administrator loses control of the platform and has no possibility of stopping the execution of bundles, even if he detects the offending bundles. Thus, with the Sun JVM, the platform freezes or aborts under denial of service attacks.
A1 -Modification of a static variable.
Bundle A defines an array as a static variable and works on the elements of the array. Bundle B finds the static variable either at compiletime, or at runtime through the Java reflection API. B sets the contents of the array to null. Result with Sun JVM: Bundle A throws a NullPointerException. Result with I-JVM: I-JVM isolates bundles so that they cannot access another bundle's static variables. The array is duplicated, therefore the modifications made by bundle B are local to bundle B. Bundle A continues to work on the array.
A2 -Synchronized method or synchronized call block.
Bundle A calls a static synchronize method defined in a class that belongs to the bundle. Bundle A therefore synchronizes on the java.lang.Class object of the class. Another bundle B explicitly synchronizes on the object, holding the object forever. Result with Sun JVM: Bundle A is blocked. Result with I-JVM: I-JVM disallows the sharing of strings, java.lang.Class objects and static variables, therefore there is no interference between bundles that do not communicate with each other. Therefore, bundle A continues to run.
A3 -Memory exhaustion.
A set of bundles are running on the platform. The OSGi runtime dynamically installs a new one that allocates many objects and stores them in an array, thus preventing the GC from deallocating the objects. Result with Sun JVM: All bundles get a OutOfMemoryError when allocating a new object. Result with I-JVM: I-JVM counts the memory used by each bundle. Based on this information, the administrator kills the offending bundle and all other bundles continue to run.
A4 -Standalone infinite loop.
A set of bundles are running on the platform. The OSGi runtime dynamically installs a new one that runs an infinite loop. Result with Sun JVM: The non-malicious bundles make progress slowly. Result with I-JVM: I-JVM counts the CPU usage of each bundle. Based on this information, the administrator kills the offending bundle and all other bundles continue to run.
A5 -Excessive object creation.
A set of bundles are running on the platform. The OSGi runtime dynamically installs a new one that allocates many objects but does not keep a reference to them, thus triggering the GC many times. Result with Sun JVM: The JVM spends its time garbage collecting. The non-offending bundles make progess slowly.
Result with I-JVM: I-JVM counts the number of times a bundle runs a GC. Based on this information, the administrator kills the offending bundle and all other bundles continue to run. 
A5 -Excessive

A8 -Lack of termination support.
Bundle A calls bundle B and is waiting for an object value. Bundle B returns an object that points to the internal representation of bundle B in the OSGi platform. Bundle A stores the reference in one of its variable, thus the garbage collection can not delete bundle B until the reference is released. Bundle B then makes a denial of service attack. Therefore, the administrator tries to unload bundle B. Result with Sun JVM: The OSGi platform is unable to unload the bundle, and the attack continues to run. Result with I-JVM: All threads that execute code from bundle B throw an exception and execution never returns to bundle B.
These results show that I-JVM offers better isolation and resource control than a standard JVM. By isolating bundles and charging resource, I-JVM enables an administrator to find, locate and stop misbehaving bundles. While isolation and termination do not need any administration assistance, locating misbehaving bundles is still in the hands of the administrator. We plan as future work to write per bundle or per bundle group resource policies to automate denial of service detections.
Related Work
Our approach combines ideas from different research areas. In this section, we report how our work relates to (i) operating system structures for resource management and communications and (ii) resource accounting and isolation in JVMs.
Operating Systems
The OSGi architecture resembles that of a micro-kernel operating systems, where multiple modules run in their own protection domains and communicate by means of InterProcess Communications (IPC) primitives. However, protection domains in micro-kernels are implemented as separate virtual address spaces, and must therefore cope with data copying during IPCs. While a number of projects achieve good performance in their IPCs implementation [7, 11, 13, 25] , communications are still an order of magnitude less efficient than simple procedure calls.
Micro-kernels such as JX [17] or Singularity [21] use safe languages to run modules in a single address space. These systems enforce isolation by implementing communications through capability-like objects [23] or shared heaps [12] . Both cases break compatibility with existing OSGi applications.
The Scout operating system [33] , Rialto [22] , and resource containers [6] introduce new approaches for resource accounting in operating systems. Threads in these systems are not bound to a protection domain but migrate between protection domains while charging resources to a single resource management entity. These systems differentiate users and protection domains. In OSGi a protection domain (i.e. a bundle) is a user.
Isolation in Java Virtual Machines
The standard isolation mechanism in current JVMs is based on class loaders [24] . Class loaders provide name space isolation, i.e. there is no collision between classes with the same name but loaded by two different class loaders. Class loaders have weak isolation guarantees, as they still share static variables, interned strings and java.lang.Class objects. OSGi uses class loaders as well as Java permissions to enhance security and limit the rights of a bundle. A method that performs a privileged operation such as System.exit asks the JVM the protection level of its caller. The JVM inspects the stack trace to find which class loader loaded the class of the caller. A class loader can be given a security policy, which indicates what kind of privileged operations the classes loaded by this class loader can perform. Inspection of a stack is an expensive operation, which would dramatically reduce the performance of our approach if it were performed on each access to a static variable, string or java.lang.Class.
There are many projects that attempt to add softwarebased processes to the JVM [5, 9, 10, 19] . While these systems provide isolation, termination and resource management, they change the programming model for communications and therefore break compatibility with existing OSGi applications.
The Secure JVM [35] is closer to our work. It is an implementation of a JVM on top of an extensible operating system. Modules run in their own address space. Programmers write inter-module communications like simple procedure calls. However, the operating system performs page remapping and object relocation during an inter-module call, which incurs performance penalties as compared to a simple procedure call. Moreover, the Secure JVM can not run on commodity systems.
Rudys et al. define soft termination for language-based systems [32] . Each Java class is annotated with a boolean value, indicating whether the class has to be stopped. The value is polled regularly by methods defined in the class. Because the polling code is inserted on backwards branches and after method calls, termination is sure to happen in a finite amount of time. They have implemented soft termination with bytecode rewriting. I-JVM implements hard termination in the core JVM: instead of inserting polling code, the compiler unwinder and machine code rewriting ensures that the code of the class will never be executed anymore and stops instantaneously. Overall, I-JVM is a refinement of three research projects: isolates in Java [9] , soft termination [32] and garbage collector memory accounting [30] in language based systems.
Finally, in the context of OSGi, Service Coroner [14] is an administration tool to find stalled bundles. A stalled bundle is a terminating bundle that can not be unloaded because other bundles maintain unused references to it. Service Coroner does not modify the JVM or OSGi, but uses aspect oriented programming to instrument the creation of bundles. While adressing two different problems, both Service Coroner and our work attempt to give an administrator better control of the OSGi platform.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have described the design and implementation of I-JVM, a Java Virtual Machine extended with component isolation and termination in OSGi. I-JVM enables lightweight isolation of OSGi bundles while still providing fast communication through thread migration across bundles and direct sharing of objects. The isolate architecture of I-JVM allows a per-bundle resource accounting that an administrator can use to terminate a misbehaving bundle. Even though isolation and resource accounting has a small overhead compared to a regular JVM, our evaluation shows that I-JVM is able to inform an administrator of denial of service attacks.
In this paper, we considered resource accounting as an assistance for an administrator to locate possible resource problems and kill the bundles he thinks are malicious. However the administrator must be aware of what I-JVM measures: as Price et al. explain in [30] , the memory usage statistics for a module are between a maximum (i.e. all shared objects used by the module are charged to the module) and a minimum (i.e. none of the shared objects are charged to the module). Also, bundles still have the possibility to create a resource Trojan horse problem [20] . Resource policies and bundles must be written with these problems in mind. Similarly, our CPU accounting mechanism is not as precise as a system where threads do not migrate. Precise techniques such as the one described in [8] incur a significant time overhead, reported to be between 67% and 279%, that we can not afford.
We plan as future work to implement a policy engine that will be able to handle such problems. Combined with the isolation and termination features presented in this paper, this will make I-JVM a more robust system to run OSGi applications.
